# 644 | ResearchBox

ResearchBox # 644 - 'Does Hoodwinking Others Pay?'

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Van Zant AB, Kennedy JA, Kray LJ. (2022) 'Does hoodwinking others pay? The psychological and relational consequences of undetected negotiator deception'. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. .
doi: 10.1037/pspi0000410

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August 27, 2022   (files may not be changed, deleted, or added)

Alex Van Zant (alex.vanzant@rutgers.edu)
Jessica Kennedy (jessica.kennedy@vanderbilt.edu)
Laura Kray (ljkray@berkeley.edu)

Lies often go undetected, and we know little about the psychological and relational consequences of successfully deceiving others. While the evidence to date indicates that undetected dishonesty induces positive affect in independent decision contexts, we propose that it may elicit guilt and undermine satisfaction in negotiations despite facilitating better deals for deceivers. Across four studies, we find support for a deceiver’s guilt account, whereby dishonesty triggers guilt and lessens negotiators’ satisfaction with the bargaining experience. This pattern is robust to several factors, including the size of negotiators’ incentives and individual differences in negotiators’ moral character. It holds for both lies issued of negotiators’ own volition and in compliance with others’ orders. Large incentives also exacerbated dishonesty-induced guilt. Further, dissatisfaction stemming from dishonesty-induced guilt had downstream relational consequences. Despite going undetected, dishonesty in a focal negotiation reduced deceivers’ likelihood of choosing to interact again with the same counterpart and adversely impacted their subjective value in future negotiations with that counterpart.